The Gender Box(es)12
Jun 18, 2023To some, gender is an oppressive system designed to keep women down. People go around saying girls are made of sugar and spice, and boys are made of snips and snails, and pretty soon you’re making 80 cents on the dollar. But there’s another side to gender.
Comments (23)
Tim Smith
Tuesday, May 16, 2023 -- 10:32 PM
Gender is reflected inGender is reflected in personal identity, biological reality, and societal constructs. Oppression, self-identification, and hard biological facts touch upon questions of nature vs. nurture, identity, and selfhood, freedom vs. determinism, ethics, justice, and a balance of epistemological approaches and intersectional impacts of bias in social and personal perspectives. The shorter prompts are the harder ones to answer sometimes, so let me answer the following:
The critical disambiguation is that sex and gender are not the same. Sex breaks down into Anatomical, Gonadal, and Chromosomal. Anatomical sex refers to overt differences, including differences in the external genitalia and other sexual characteristics, like muscle, fat, and body hair. Gonadal sex refers to the presence of male or female gonads, the testes, or ovaries. Chromosomal sex is the distribution of the sex chromosomes between women and men. We all have varying manifestations of all three of these.
Gender, on the other hand, can be described in even more ways (I know of thirteen different genders – and there are probably many more.) In my state, only three are recognized M, F, and X for male, female, and non-binary or unspecified. These sexes and genders don't necessarily align, but for all but less than 1% of people, they do align, and no further thought or inquiry is needed. This begs the question – Why now? Why is there so much focus on gender?
Advocacy movements and social media have allowed for greater expression. There is greater acceptance, especially in younger generations. Advances in science have explained some overt transgender biology that challenges the idea of gender as a social construct. Protective and oppressive laws both have found their way into our government. Most interesting is the intersectional influence of neurodiversity, class, race, and sexuality in shaping individual experiences. Finally, globalization has brought different cultural practices together to challenge existing norms. None of this new focus comes without concerns and worries.
What can we know about societal beliefs about gender? How reliable is the current account? What language should we use to protect and respect our genders? When should we allow hormone treatment for youth or sex assignment surgery for intersex infants or precocious transgender children? To what extent are individuals free to define their identity, and what part is due to external forces? The answers can be discomfiting, and it is for me.
As much new data as there is on sex and gender, sexual orientation is another matter altogether. I don't know of any substantive data on what drives sexual interest or how malleable or staid our sexual drives can be.
Another cause for concern is whether there is any difference between the genders and sexes in mental and physical ability at all. The difference in means is far outstripped by the variation and overlap in spread. Sexual dimorphism exists in several regions of the human brain, including areas involved in sexual and reproductive behaviors, memory, emotion, spatial awareness, and stress. Transgender subjects are critical examples of these differences, as the specific strengths and weaknesses of gender have been shown to modulate under the influence of hormone treatment in these people.
I'm going too long because I'm not sure what to think here, and I'm not comfortable calling for change when the cause of some gender issues is technological and not biologically grounded. Hopefully, this show will help.
Daniel
Wednesday, May 17, 2023 -- 4:44 PM
The last sentence above isThe second to last sentence above is enlightening, which is here interpreted in the light of an implicit claim that if you don't know what to say, you should keep talking. Explicit mention however is here made with regards to being "not sure what to think", --an interesting expression. If you were sure, would you even need to? But to the issue of gender, fundamentally it looks like a category of response, as it is reflected in language by the gender of substantives. Is there a common thread which pulls together your diverse reflections above? What does the term "neurodiversity" in the fourth paragraph refer to? Are you implying that neurons differ from one another just as people do? Are there male and female neurons?
Tim Smith
Thursday, May 18, 2023 -- 6:54 AM
No Yes Brain variation. No NoDaniel
Thursday, May 18, 2023 -- 3:34 PM
You haven't left a great dealYou haven't left a great deal of room for agreement here. While the last two answers provoke no controversy, the first must be qualified with regards to how the difference between certitude and investigation is understood, the second is groundless in the absence of a further explanation, and the third suffers from an extreme content-ambiguity. What is the nature of this variation of which your third answer speaks? Do brains change color or size? Do you speak of many brains differing from each other, or one brain which changes over time? Until these and similar concerns are considered, your third answer remains singularly vacuous.
In opposition to your view, which I repeat appears to have resulted from existing prejudgments taken up in unanalyzed form, I offer an argument below whereby it is concluded that, as a category of response, the concept of gender is correctly described as a principle of organization handed down by different traditions in different ways but always as a means of dividing things into separate classes, and therefore only by the accident of convenience is it applied to differences in sex.
In the Addition to section 166 of the Philosophy of Right Hegel applies the distinction to a comparison between animals and plants, basically arguing that men are like animals and women are similar to plants. Although it's one of Hegel's more notorious passages, as well as quite amusing, it's my opinion that he's right in the sense that the distinction between plants and animals is more basic and primitive than that between men and women, and that therefore the latter is acquired only insofar as the former is applied to it.
The difference between dogs and cats can be submitted to a similar analysis, with male and female associations respectively. The larger and more comprehensive differences obtain logical priority over the smaller ones in more regional contexts, even if occurring afterwards in experience-chronology. This should accordingly also be true of more minute distinctions within each side of the larger ones, reapplying the convention to whatever is to be distinguished. So let us take the first half of the equation, with the assertion that "all men are dogs". The verification of the truth of this claim would have to be obtained from the observation of dogs in one's experience. Here a concept of gender, as a mere convention, can be applied to both the object to be observed and the researcher observing it. In a purely heuristic sense, then, one could say that from a perspective described as feminine, (only as distinctly opposed to masculine), a dog is seen and understood as similar to a child. But from a masculine perspective, a dog is seen as a version of himself. And this furnishes some explanatory ground for the symbiotic relation humans have with canine species which has nothing to do with survival, but rather attraction. "Women", seeing dogs as children, have good reason to feel warmly towards them, whereas "men", seeing themselves as dogs, do so without needing a good reason to feel warmly towards them. Applying the convention of gender to dogs, then, we arrive at
1) The Dog of Identity
a) Male, and
2) The Dog of Reason
a) Female.
Because the Dog of Identity and the Dog of Reason do not contradict each other, and that the claim that "all men are dogs" is verified precisely by showing how the gender distinction upon which its first term depends is reapplied to the predicate in the second term, the concept of gender can be shown conclusively to consist of a pure convention of generic pair-distinction obtained prior to any empirical observations, including those involving sexual distinctions. Is this argument successful? If so, it seems to thoroughly abolish your view that gender derives from neurological differences.
Tim Smith
Thursday, May 18, 2023 -- 5:59 PM
Daniel,Daniel,
In my comments, I made reference to 'neurodiversity'—a concept that emphasizes the variability and uniqueness of every individual's brain, akin to our fingerprints. It's not about assigning gender to neurons, but rather understanding the wide spectrum of human neurological development.
This understanding of neurodiversity, combined with the societal and cultural factors (intersectionality), shapes the way individuals express and interpret their gender. For a better grasp of what I meant by neurodiversity, you might find the following links insightful:
• Harvard Health Blog: What is neurodiversity?
• Wikipedia: Neurodiversity
To your point about my uncertainty, I'd like to clarify that uncertainty often accompanies knowledge and understanding. The more we know, the more we realize what we don't know. This is particularly true in complex areas such as gender studies, where new research often leads to more questions than answers. Uncertainty here is expressed by offering more questions to address in the show. Specifically if we can trust the modern account of gender, and other concerns addressed above.
I have read what I could of Ray’s forthcoming book on Google Books (a short sample of the intro) but I’m eager to hear her thoughts, and hope she addresses some of your questions, as well as mine.
Best,
Tim
Daniel
Friday, May 19, 2023 -- 2:40 PM
My question was for you, notMy question was for you, not somebody else. If you want questions addressed to you to be answered by someone else, it should be specifically requested. In the absence of that I'll repeat it. Does the argument from the Dog of Identity and the Dog of Reason work? If it does, and the concept of gender can be shown to derive from more primitive distinctions such as animal/plant, night/day, etc., then where does that leave your original position that refers to how different people have different neurons? I say "original" because it changes a little in the first paragraph above, which seems to suggest that it's a separate issue altogether, raising the question of why it was brought up in the first place. And if it's too difficult for you to evaluate my argument on your own, then perhaps you could reply to another question: If someone asks "why is the Statue of Liberty on the eastern coast of the United States a woman?", would you respond by saying that it's because of her neurons?
Tim Smith
Saturday, May 20, 2023 -- 6:11 AM
Daniel,Daniel,
The introduction of neurodiversity in my initial post was not to suggest that it is the sole or primary factor in the concept of gender but to illustrate that the variety of human brains and their development can influence how individuals perceive and express their gender. The intersectional aspect, both complex and in some cases troubling, is, in the main, indicative of the existence of multiple paths to gender expression and identity.
Your 'Dog of Identity' and 'Dog of Reason' thought experiment, while interesting for its own sake and appellation, oversimplifies the complexity of cisgender identity and its intersection with neurodiversity. You have yet to come to terms with neurodiversity, and it might be helpful to read about the concepts before reducing them meaninglessly to their neural components.
Addressing your question about the Statue of Liberty, the gender of the statue is a human construct chosen by the creators and influenced by cultural, historical, and symbolic factors. It has no neurons, and I don't know what you are saying there.
It's important to note that Hegel didn't explicitly write the words you quoted. The additions to § 166 of his work 'Elements of the Philosophy of Right' are added from notes taken from his students by Eduard Gans. The reflections are on the misogyny that was common at that time. Hegel likely said these things and more likely his students thought them, but Hegel never wrote them. In any case, gender is neither a significant component of Hegel's primary projects nor are his views on gender foundational to the modern account.
It would help if you articulated around scientific understanding. Such articulation is required in modern philosophy. Cisgender origination is a mystery; stories like those you tell here are apocryphal at best. Men and women have far more in common than apart. The need to wear both masculine and feminine hats, and the recluse of no hat at all, are calls more and more people heed and need to be successful in our modern world.
It is time to take a step back and let Ray enlighten us, as there are serious issues for our world to decipher concerning gender and lives in the balance. I will take this step now.
Take care,
Tim
Daniel
Sunday, May 21, 2023 -- 1:30 PM
Your claim that the Statue ofYour claim that the Statue of Liberty has no neurons can be challenged. Taking as an indication of topic-locality expressions such as "she/he has still got her/his marbles" or "she/he has lost her/his marbles", and understood as referring to cephalic contents, a neuron can be described as the smallest possible marble. Each marble corresponds to a equally tiny quantity of perception, or a strictly particular quality which is perceived. Their combination which is cranially contained produces the subsequently emergent objects of individual experience, no two of which are the same. This account is based on your description of 5/18/23 5:59 pm above in the first paragraph. But a difficulty arises when two people see the same statue and both claim to see a female as constructed out of some or other materials. Of diverse neuropathy, no strong sense of identity can be ascribed to a common object of both perceptions, and therefore what is asserted is a single property of two separate objects. This property is female-ness, the purported universal. If the property is produced in each case by a corresponding neural particular, a special arrangement of tiny intracranial marbles, if you will, then this property must also be slightly different in each case, constituting a different property altogether. Application of the neuropathic model to gender as a property of objects therefore results in a question about the existence of universals. A Realist position here could speak of a formal universal, a single kind of neuron, or a material universal, a single neuron. An electron could be said to be an example of the first type, and the Statue of Liberty's gender can be suggested, as I argue here, to be of the second type. In contrast to the Neural Diversity of objects, stands the Neural Singularity of properties. Because these are not special kinds of things or classes but singular things themselves, this latter position does not violate your Principle of Diverse-Neurality, since the condition of diversity, or unconditioned particularity, does not preclude the possibility of shared particulars or an inter-cranial trade in singular components.
This explains how two people can see different objects while both seeing the same property which is ascribed to them. The challenge to the claim of the famous Liberty-statue's non-neurality therefore arises from the Realist position for the Neuro-diverse model, as it bears the predicate of its gender precisely because the sack of marbles which generates its predicates is shared between different marble arrangements, themselves incapable of reproducing a true representation of the same object. A material Realism of property-universals therefore saves the existence of gender from the conventional distinctions between men and women. Is this challenge successful?
Tim Smith
Sunday, May 21, 2023 -- 5:58 PM
Daniel,Daniel,
While your argument is interesting and semantically engaging, there seems to be some confusion about the role of neurons, the neurodiversity principle, and the notion of gender as a construct, especially regarding inanimate objects like the Statue of Liberty.
When I state that the Statue of Liberty has no neurons, I'm referring to the simple biological fact that the statue, as an inanimate object, does not possess a biological system. Your metaphorical application of the phrase "losing one's marbles" to neurons and then to the perception of gender in objects is creative, but it misconstrues the essential purpose of neurons. Neurons are not merely "tiny intracranial marbles" which generate perception. They are specialized cells involved in the processing and transmission of information in the nervous system.
Neurodiversity is about recognizing and respecting variations in the human brain and mind, which can affect how individuals perceive and understand the world. Here, the focus is on the individual, not the objects that the individual perceives. Your application of neurodiversity to inanimate objects, while intriguing and far more palatable than the two-dog account, strays from its intended definition.
As for the Statue of Liberty, its perceived gender is indeed a social construct, a product of the human mind. However, it is essential to clarify that this gendering is not contingent on the statue's inherent "neurons," as it doesn't have any. Instead, it results from cultural, historical, and symbolic factors, which are interpreted through the lenses of our individual and collective ideas.
While worth pondering, the universality or singularity of properties that you refer to moves the conversation into the domain of philosophical realism and the age-old debate about universals and particulars. This conversation can quickly spiral into metaphysical intricacies that are not directly related to our initial discussion on gender, or the sub-thread here trending into neurodiversity.
The construction of gender is a complex interplay of individual biology (including neurodiversity), personal identity, societal norms, and cultural influences. Ascribing gender to inanimate objects, while culturally significant, is not indicative of the neurological, biological, and sociocultural factors that constitute gender in living beings.
I like this track better than the binary opposition argument (which, to be fair – Deborah Tannen did with Mars/Venus – but strictly with communication styles); however, this post seems to miss the essence of neurodiversity and more pointedly the construction of gender, veering off instead into abstract metaphysical territories.
It's important to ground these discussions in a solid understanding of the biological and sociocultural aspects involved while focusing on the human beings for whom gender has no cause but is vital to their identity and self-expression.
Fundamentally we should stress the commonality of the human experience in our discussion of gender, along with possible views of the subtlety. It is only in the sixth week of gestation that hormonal differences occur in the developing fetus, along with several other complicated tipping points in development later on. Changes in the body, or treatments applied under a doctor’s care greatly impact the physical and psychological expression of ones gender. However different that outcome is, each individual is entitled to their personal views of their experience regardless of social queues and norms. Whether we should condone treatment of people prior to adulthood, or “correct” gender outcomes at any point is one of the questions to be considered here, at least from my personal view. Can does not imply ought even as ought does imply can.
Best,
Tim
Daniel
Monday, May 22, 2023 -- 6:04 PM
You've begged the question.You've begged the question. I didn't say the Statue of Liberty has neurons. I said she is one, --insofar as she's a woman, anyway. The claim is based on a material Realism of essential properties. In this case the property is female-ality. As material and not formal, the essential properties must be singular entities instead of types of things or classes, which in this case can not directly apply to differences in sex because these can be indistinct. Assuming the truth of your claim in the second paragraph above that neurons have an "essential purpose" (second sentence), and that this involves the process of perception (fourth sentence), essential properties can be posited to exist in reality, under the criterion of the material universal, in the form of singular neurons which all the neuron containers somehow hang on to at the same time or perhaps imperceptibly toss back and forth between themselves for the purposes of intelligible discussion. Whatever the case, having a purpose implies design of an agent, which in relation to the Statue is constituted by the choice of its gender by its manufacturer, and received by the shared neuron constituting the existence of the essential property. Now a choice is a singular decision which can't be divided into smaller decisions, and therefore has a one-to-one relationship with the essential predicate it wants to apply. If the principle of parsimony is applied to this relation, in preference for the explanation with the least number of elements, then it's better to explain the statue's gender with one neuron rather than two, and to conclude that the decision to make something female and the perception of it as such is instantiated by the same material universal, --one lonely neuron.
Tim Smith
Monday, May 22, 2023 -- 6:46 PM
Daniel,Daniel,
Thank you for your thoughtful reply. You've delved into some complex areas of philosophy here, and it's clear you've given them careful consideration.
While the areas of philosophical realism and the debate on universals and particulars are fascinating, they may not directly align with our ongoing discussion on gender and neurodiversity. Nonetheless, given the relevance of these philosophical concepts to our conversation, I'll briefly touch on them.
In philosophical realism, the existence of universals or abstract objects is posited to be independent of our perception, understanding, or language. The debate about universals and particulars can indeed intersect with our discussion when considering individual experiences of gender versus overarching societal constructions of gender.
Yet, it's important to remember that these philosophical concepts, while providing useful frameworks, can become quite abstract and detached from people's lived experiences and practical realities. The complexity of our discussion shouldn't detract from the harsh reality many individuals face.
Speaking of real-world implications, let's not forget the distressingly high suicide rates within the transgender community. According to the 2015 U.S. Transgender Survey, 40.4% of transgender adults reported attempting suicide at some point in their lifetimes, and 7.3% reported attempting suicide in the past year. This is compared to a suicide rate of 1.4% in the general population. These figures remind us of the immense struggle many individuals face in grappling with their gender identity, particularly within a society that often misunderstands or outright rejects them.
In light of these sobering statistics, our focus should remain on the social, biological, and personal aspects that define gender for each person. As we discuss these topics, it's important to keep in mind the impact of our discussions on real people's lives and identities.
I hope this brings some clarity to these philosophical points, but let's ensure our discussions stay connected to the practical and experiential realities of gender and neurodiversity.
Best,
Tim
Daniel
Tuesday, May 23, 2023 -- 6:07 PM
Why? Your imperative here isWhy? Your imperative here is indescribable as anything other than arbitrary. Do you mean to claim that that there are no theoretical and unexperienced realities of gender? If so why not and if there are what are they? Your expression of desire for control here presents a specific characteristic described by a plausible theory of gender which arises from considerations of an agent's goal of control of one's environment by means of control over another agent, or the goal of control in one usurping the ability to control in another. Trying to tell people what they should and shouldn't talk about is characteristic of a kind of vulgar chauvinism associated with inherited authority without reflection.
In the history of liberation struggles the formerly oppressed inherits the sensed connection between one's own freedom and the means by which everyone else's is exercised. These are kept separate within the oppressor-class and are brought together by specialized reform internally rather than generalized connections already existing in external form. Every popular liberation is therefore an epistemic revolution in the knowledge of the connection between humans and nature, freedom and necessity. In gender this refers to women's liberation, identified as a class of the formerly oppressed. The question can be asked however why the gender of the struggle has to be specified at all? Are all the other liberation struggles just for men? The reference to an oppressed class necessarily implies an oppressor class and, as characterized in terms of gender, these constitute the two largest such classes. In the case where one struggles to liberate itself from control by the other, then, it would be the most comprehensive such struggle which is possible for terrestrial humanity.
There is therefore a gender of revolution. Insofar as the liberation movement within the oppressed gender is the most comprehensive and serves to unbind the others from their former limits kept in place by the repressive forms which it seeks to remove, it's no metaphor to talk about female revolutions, as constituted by gender-based rebellion.
Tim Smith
Wednesday, May 24, 2023 -- 10:33 AM
Daniel,Daniel,
My primary concern is for the human elements of this discussion, including, but not limited to, the genuine suffering many individuals face regarding gender identity. There is no imperative there, and I am concerned that you reply with confusion and irrationality. While a little bit of wack is required in all things philosophical, we need to take responsibility for the quality of our conversations, especially when we respond to the thought of others. Let me give you some of my own wack back.
As a member of the Community-of-Thinkers (CoT), you are allowed to post whatever fits within the guidelines of our community. When you hit the reply button – a bit more is asked. It would help if you kept it relevant, not only to the show but to the thought and mind of the person you are replying to.
My original post above and the show prompt to which I respond speak to the phenomenology of authentic gender in our present world. If you want to post about the “theoretical and unexperienced realities of gender,” you find yourself in the wrong place. Make a separate post and encourage others to comment.
If your ask of me is to give up my focus on the complexity of gender, that is not going to happen. I have responded to your points in the exchanges above but can summarize them below
I could go on, and I have.
If you are looking for a common element in our interlocution – it is “you.” Now you state that I have a desire to usurp your control. To the contrary, I’ve been very indulgent in your thought with pointed redirects to my post and to that of the show prompt that it supposedly replies. Another common element is your persistent pushback and modulation of tone and argument. I have been generous on this front as well – unfortunately you seem centered on conflict and refuse to come to common ground or common terms even. If you feel differently, I don’t desire to change that. I am only reporting out my impression.
This generous indulgence in your thought has ended, and that is not vulgar or chauvinistic or any combination of these two names. I wish you wellness and encourage you to figure out your thoughts about gender with clarity and authentic care. I want this for you in all your philosophical endeavors, wherever you post them.
Take care,
Tim
Daniel
Thursday, May 25, 2023 -- 5:39 PM
So then what's your take onSo then what's your take on non-binary dependency on an original binary convention for self-identity as in some part dependent on what it's not? Is there a binary non-binarity?
Tim Smith
Thursday, May 25, 2023 -- 7:29 AM
No Yes Brain variation. No NoRay's book, What Even is Gender? is not out for another week, but there are some older and more recent books in the meantime. If others have read books they like on gender, it might help me come to terms were they to post them here. Until someone close lives with atypical gender, I don't think the issue even came to mind. For some in Neuroscience, that was Ben Barres. I'm still thinking this out. Here are some books I have read, not entirely on the subject, but helpful.
Each vector through, around, or spring new tangents on gender and its complicated relation to sex. Rudacille might need/want an update, and that is only coming on a 20th anniversary.
When Ray's book comes out, I will also give it a complete and personal review here. I'm looking forward to the discussion in this show.
Tim Smith
Monday, June 5, 2023 -- 3:44 AM
The publishers of What EvenThe publishers of What Even is Gender? have assured me that this book will have full open access as advertised on their website. That access is not happening, at least not yet.
I will keep this post as a placeholder until I get full access, or fork over the $170 hardcover price or $50 e-book price, or my local library can get access. I’m somewhat tempted to rent it for six months for $20 – the cheapest version that would allow full access – but I don’t see doing that when I am told it is supposed to be openly available – and many authors deserve my direct support or attention. Such is the state of academic and open-access publishing.
Fortunately, this will allow a vetting of Ray’s comments on the show once the Open Access link is updated versus the book's entire content – which I will do when the time comes. Such is the state of Public Philosophy, and many questions could be asked that are not due to the hurdles of academic publishing.
Daniel
Tuesday, May 30, 2023 -- 5:47 PM
The above post from 5/25/23The above post from 5/25/23 by participant Smith raises for me two very interesting questions to which a response is sought. The first asks about the goal of "coming to terms" for which book suggestions are requested. Are these terms definitions or conclusions? Is this participant calling for a definition of terms? Or does she/he seek conclusions, as suggested by the referenced process of "coming to"? Because this is not a trivial difference, the requested assistance can not be provided until the question is answered. As far as specific suggestions are concerned, however, Schopenhauer's "On Women" may be related to your ruminations above.
For the second question permit is requested to address this participant directly, so that it can be posed more clearly. It involves the two characteristics of the review which you have promised. The first is that it will be complete, which refers to the object and suggests that no significant element which is expressed in it will be neglected. The second promises that it will be personal, which refers to the subject and indicates that inclusion of particular characteristics belonging to the author should be expected. Would it be a mistake to presume by this that your own gender will constitute a central hermeneutic component of the review of a book on gender? Will this be in the form of a bias or a case study?
Two questions then, one on terms-clarification and the other on self-referential book-review expectations, now hang in the balance between anticipation of product-issue and duration of its generative process. In addition to this however you've combined considerations of personal history and individual style together with intent of thoroughgoing completeness and fidelity to objective representation. Could one ask for more? Such grandiloquence exudes the kind of supreme self-confidence that could only have emerged from deep and long standing commitments to the highest standards of scholarship. For me as well is the anticipation of the broadcast discussion very great, and as now this is coupled with your announcement of a "complete and personal" review, the field of gender studies and philosophy in general stand to gain tremendously. To repeat my questions then, insured by your honest and gentle nature that their answers are forthcoming, --are the common terms which you seek definitions or conclusions and, assuming that your own gender will play a central role in the review's personal aspect which you have announced, will this be a disclaimer of gender-based myopia or a self-reflective example of what it means to you to have a gender? Your readers, amongst whom it is humbly submitted I myself can be counted, with pleasure await your reply.
But let's say for the purpose of discussion that it's the second of the alternate roles which your own gender plays in the promise of the review's personal aspect, and let us further stipulate for this purpose that you self-identify as male. This is a gender designation which, as you have well pointed out, has a much wider referential extension than that of biological sex. It includes the typical social and cultural associations constructed for practical purposes or handed down by custom and tradition. Prominent amongst these are relations of marriage, parental relations to children, specialized varieties of labor, etc., in which means/ends relationships can be observed. For example, the male can be looked at as a means to the child for the female, whereas the child is seen as an end in itself. For the male the female can be seen as a means to the male's ends as an end in himself, so that the female sees the man as a child, and the man sees himself as never having stopped being a child. And these refer in turn to wider and more diffuse associations such as those having to do with zoological objects, which leads inexorably back to cats and dogs. To recall some points of that discussion, it is argued that early domestication of canine species is not only a subject for anthropology, but for gender studies as well, by reason both of the female's view of a dog as another man, and the male's view of a dog as a canine version of himself. The dog is a stand-in for the child, and the child is the end in itself for which the man is a means, who in turn believes himself to be in a way just another dog, not needing an external reason to be in close proximity to "his own kind". This is why I gave the name "the Dog of Identity" to the side of the traditional distinction associated with male-ness, and "the Dog of Reason" to the ostensibly "female" view of the same. Along these lines, then, the second alternate for the second question can be asked a little more precisely: Will the promised personal aspect of your book-review consist in part of an explication of your uniquely individual "dog of identity", as it were? I.e., how will your personal interest as a male, if that's the case, involve characterizations of the female as a means to an end, the achievement of which is itself a means to the end in itself which is the original child retained in the adult male? How will the review's "personal" aspect relate to the "Person" as an end in itself, bifurcated in the context of customary cultural determinations?
Harold G. Neuman
Friday, June 2, 2023 -- 10:51 AM
Gender was what it used to beGender was what it used to be. Along with morality and ethics. As now viewed, these things fluctuate. So, insofar as change rules some kinds of reality, in this sense, gender is meaninglless. Everything happening now affirms this.. It did not take a lot of word salad to get here.
Daniel
Sunday, June 4, 2023 -- 4:13 PM
--Not a salad, but something--Not a salad, but something from a can perhaps? The claim of meaninglessness is self-contradictory, on account of the fact that it assumes conveyable intelligibility of its reference, and therefore the meaning it purports to deny. What about the notion that gender is the cultural form of biological sex which has become self-conscious? Is gender the self-aware mode of natural sexual determination, and therefore not meaningless even while constantly in some manner of flux?
Tim Smith
Monday, June 5, 2023 -- 4:01 AM
Harold,Harold,
I agree gender is what it was. What it was needs to be clarified for me.
I intend to put some dressing on that salad without the dress. I don't have a choice, which is what you are saying?
No one here will be dressed down, which is an excellent place to start.
First, I have to be able to read the book. Very frustrating when PT does shows without sharing the content with listeners who want to understand.
Best,
Tim
Daniel
Tuesday, June 6, 2023 -- 1:59 PM
But you seem to haveBut you seem to have understood participant Neuman's metaphor quite well. Continuing it by adding salad dressing shows that it's not only well understood, but clearly delineated within its interpretive domain. Dressing is added to salad greens for the purpose ingestive palatability; and the greens are a product of nature. Words however are a product of culture insofar as they are particular to a given language. If gender is a word to which nothing real corresponds, as participant Neuman suggests, then sex must be the salad greens to which no word can be fully adequate. Dressing in the way you've deployed it above furnishes the interface between the natural greens (sex as a product of nature), and the words in cultural context of a given language (gender as a product of culture, generated for purposes of sex-palatability). As a word salad therefore needs the dressing of meaning, so does the construction of gender around biological sex need associations between the two which reconcile their different sources in palatable form, some plausible candidates for which are romance and marriage.
If this is your design, from where arises your frustration? For the understanding you've exhibited here appears to satisfy the main criteria of interpretive significance.
Harold G. Neuman
Thursday, June 8, 2023 -- 6:20 AM
Been thinking some more onBeen thinking some more on this after reading up on transgender and gender
reassignment. I have a draft essay of my own which may or may not get blog space. One snippet from that piece is a little more direct. Briefly, it says: sex is a physical characteristic of humans and other living things. Gender is a state of mind. I think, considering the modern viewpoint on this and what people are willing to do through medical science, that is about as succinct as it gets. It is not important enough to me personally to argue or debate further. So, Neuman has left this topic.
Harold G. Neuman
Sunday, July 30, 2023 -- 8:22 AM
For further consideration:For further consideration:
An idea I have been rolling around says, roughly, that cultural and sociological change tends to view matters differently than they were viewed before. Before when? That is what makes these phenomena hard to track. When people or groups of people have and cultivate interests, preferences and motives, new paradigms are created. Narratives emerge that change contexts, and, presto, contextual realities are spawned. All of this conversation around the meaning(s) of gender is a one example of contextual reality. Those who are strongly interested, deeply preferential, and highly motivated to change the minds of others and, over some period of time, old definitions, attitudes and behaviors are subsumed by new ones. Contextual reality says we make things up, as we go.. This is not a new cultural or sociological development. That it should affect something as old a view towards gender and what that term does or does not mean, is an evolutionary process, probably accelerated by transgender advocacies and the reality of sex re-assignment. Procedures such as those were not previously available. Contextual reality, or making it up as we go, had to wait until we could effect such changes in gender; attained the medical and physiological knowledge to do so. It is not rocket science---it is human will.