In the topic-description above two questions are asked: Should public condemnation overtake penal function where the law doesn't reach but should? And the other question concerns the tension between victim's justice and rights of the accused. Although the answers which participant Neuman offers above are not to these questions specifically, in service to readers who may not be familiar with participant Neuman's doctrine of Contextual Reality raised in the third answer, a hypothetical reconstruction is offered below.

If one assumes that anything real must be determinable as such in relation to a given context, then when one removes the context of something by the operation of abstraction, one removes the thing from reality, or better, translates the real thing into a mere product of the imagination for purposes of orientation in one's life amongst a great many contexts. The doctrine therefore describes not a special section of reality, but the necessary condition for any of it. And since reality by definition refers to context-independence, this implies that reality can't be known because of what it is. Or rather, the concept of reality is incompatible with its truth.

Applied to the two topic-questions, the suggestion is made that
1) public condemnation is justified only where its context and that of the legal process are the same. The context is not the same. Therefore, public condemnation is never justified.
2) The rights of the accused and justice for crime-victims are understood according to the contexts of constitutional protections and justified penalties, respectively, which are different. Both are related however to the larger contexts of human rights and common decency, which are the same. Participant Neuman's model suggests therefore that there must be a latent form or "pre-established harmony" to which both justice and right belong. Might one deign to inquire as to the precise nature of this formal harmony? The reader would surely benefit by response in this case.