If one assumes a legal status of personhood for an ostensive human individual during its stage of fetal development, this would not extend to any right of infringement on another's such status. This raised a question for me concerning the issue of fetal personhood in the event that Jarvis Thomson's 1971 argument for prenatal fetalectomy is conclusive.

The argument as I understand it compares a developing fetus with an adult who has been given a fatal diagnosis unless surgically attached to another adult's circulatory system in order to receive requisite nutrients, thereby providing nine more months of life. Good social and cultural reasons could be given with regards to why some such cases might be especially desirable, as in the case of a composer of a symphony projected to require nine months to complete, but individual characteristics of the terminally diagnosed patient strike me as non-essential to the argument. Given that both are legally protected by the rights of Persons, the fact that one life is at its beginning and another at its end is irrelevant. If no justified demand can be made to compel the life-sustaining service in one case, no such demand can be made in the other.

So where does that leave fetal personhood? Is it argued that the fetus is a person whose rights do not extend to the use of another's body for its own survival, and therefore fetalectomy can not be prohibited? Or is it not a person, as shown by the fact that fetal development within an individual and surgical attachment of one individual to another are two different things, and therefore fetalectomy can not be prohibited? Is it a modus ponens, based the mother's right of non-compulsion for use of her body for another person's survival, or is it a reductio ad absurdum, based on an incommensurability between fetal and personal rights?

Question: If Joe wants to dig a ditch in his front yard, is it OK to do it by means of Dave's lower jaw, even if Dave agrees to it? The obvious answer to this in the negative is reflected in the legal stipulation of unconscionable contract, for which both parties would be obliged to remedy. Dave could not legally accept payment for the service provided, for example. The strength of the prohibition derives from the fact that its intuitive content is free from constraint by conditions for its violation. If on the other hand special conditions are interposed which frustrate confidence in the ability to apply it across the range of potential cases, if e.g. the ditch is not dug this afternoon then the earth will spin off its axis and Dave's jaw is the only one available with enough teeth sufficient for the task, or something like that, the original intuition is not affected and the "Spirit of the law" remains in tact independently from unforeseen variations in the Letter.

Jarvis Thomson says by my reading that such unconditioned contents of ethical intuition are "facts" not about the person which has them, but about people in general, and thus in some sense are shared by everybody and thus described as facts about human beings,*(1) making clear how different assumptions are made where one speaks of "digging with a shovel" as contrasted to "digging with Dave". In her seminal essay on Trolley and related problems, J.T. offers a number of examples where confidence in the truth of the claim that "killing is worse than letting die", a kind of ethical universal, can be frustrated by special conditions for their optional instantiation. If killing can't be avoided, for example, as in the case of a trolley without brakes on track to kill five people which can be steered onto another killing only one, steering the trolley is permissible on account of the fact that the one has no more claim than the five on how the impact of the trolley should be distributed, but is not required because the conductor did not discretely generate the conditions of her or his options. On the other hand if the only way to stop the trolley is to push a person onto the track heavy enough to stop it and there happens to be one such individual standing in the appropriate spot, killing the heavy person is not ethically permissible because this person's right over her/his own body overrides the claim of the five on how the trolley impact is distributed. But what if the heavy person had deliberately placed the five in the spot where the trolley would hit in order to kill them? Then pushing the heavy person could be seen to be permissible but not required. But what if someone had trespassed onto the spot where the trolley could be steered to avoid killing the five, ignoring warning signs of the speeding trolley hazard?*(2) Here the one has less of a claim against trolley impact than the five, so that it could be claimed that steering it into the one is required, --and anything required is also permitted. Or a contrary scenario is offered where someone could be encouraged to be where the one is without being informed of the danger known to the person who encouraged it, which could support a recommendation to remain on track to hit the five.

I suspect that my conclusion from this that J.T.'s analysis in no way supports an argument against ethical universals will be a minority opinion over against interpretations less committed to condition-independent principles and more favorable to contextualist models deriving from coherence amongst their particular applications. Some assistance to my position however may be furnished by the fact that instantiation of a principle is not a necessary condition for its existence. If instantiation of Kant's categorical imperative to conduct deliberate actions under universalization-constraint were impossible to verify by observation or experience, for example, this in itself would not argue against its truth or efficacy. Even in cases where the implicit universality of the claim can be brought into harmony with the foreseeable consequences of its comprehensive use, as with the hypothetical imperative not to lie, the categorical one is thereby instantiated only insofar as it contains the claim that trust in honesty is necessary for human survival and the species couldn't dispense with it, though many circumstances can be supplied which present situations where violating this imperative would be required, --again a minority view.
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*(1) Judith Jarvis Thomson, "Killing, Letting Die, and the Trolley Problem" 59 The Monist (1976); p. 205.
*(2) ibid., p. 211.

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The philosophical discussion around Judith Jarvis Thomson’s argument is always thought-provoking, especially when it comes to defining rights and bodily autonomy. The comparison to life-sustaining attachment raises important ethical questions about personhood and obligation. For those who enjoy engaging in deep discussions like this, www.rollandwin.com/forum/ is a great space to explore a variety of topics, including responsible gaming and industry insights. It’s an active community where meaningful conversations take place, making it a valuable resource for those looking to exchange perspectives.

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