Philosopher of Action

09 January 2025

Elizabeth Anscombe was a hugely important 20th-century philosopher who worked on many topics, including history, metaphysics, religion, and language. But above all she was a pioneering figure in the philosophy of action, where she put forward fascinating theories about intention.

To get a feel for one of those theories, imagine you’re on a train with three other passengers, all strangers. When the train leaves the station there’s a sudden jolt, and Passenger A bumps into you; he makes his apologies, and all is fine. When the train’s in steady movement, Passenger B bumps into you on purpose. (This fellow's probably thinking to himself something along the lines of “that guy looks like a literature professor! I’ll teach him not to talk about Proust all the time.”) This is clearly a different case.

Somehow you make it to your destination without further damage. At this point, Passenger C, who's in a hurry to get to an interview, makes a bolt for the door—and bumps into you on the way. (You're really not having a great day, are you?) OK, so Passenger A had no intention to harm you; Passenger B jostled you on purpose; but what should we say about Passenger C? Maybe it's simple: she moved her body through space, in a particular trajectory; that trajectory collided with your body; and she followed that trajectory deliberately—so she deliberately ran into you. But somehow that doesn't feel right.

Here’s where Anscombe has a really interesting insight: she says there are many ways of describing one and the same action, and whether or not someone did something intentionally depends on how we describe it.

Anscombe's most famous example starts with a guy putting water into a well, from where it goes into a house. This guy may sound like a helpful sort, but hold on: it turns out that the water is poisoned. At which point he may sound like a villain, but hold on again: the people in the house are Nazis!

Confused? Well, Anscombe’s point is that we can describe what this man is doing in four different ways: (a) he’s putting water in a well; (b) he’s supplying water to the house; (c) he’s poisoning people; (d) he’s killing Nazis. Depending on which description we use, we're going to assess his action differently.

So what does this tell us about the woman in the train? She also did something that can be seen in many different ways: she ran toward a door; she rushed to get to her interview; she bumped into a literature professor. Her action looks very different depending on how you describe it.

More specifically, she only intended some of this—she certainly never meant to spoil anyone's day. According to Anscombe, she didn't even intend to get the job she was interviewing for: you can’t intend to get a cool job, since getting a job depends on other people and so isn’t entirely up to you.

So where does that leave us? In the capable hands of our Anscombe-expert guest, Rachael Wiseman, author of The Routledge Guidebook to Anscombe’s 'Intention'.

Comments (4)


Daniel's picture

Daniel

Monday, January 13, 2025 -- 3:24 PM

Individual intention

Individual intention underdetermined by recognition of the range of contribution-variants to its success indicates an argument for reduction of effect authorship where claims of optional determination are made. If someone goes fishing and catches a fish, for example, the intention to do so plays a relatively small role in the final result. But as I read the argument this applies to much more exclusive contexts such as painting a picture or writing a novel, which produces a tension between considerations of general causes, a stream's accessible location perhaps, in the fishing example, and particular causes, e.g. the use of a different kind of lure after many failed attempts with an alternate.

In another example, the event of climate change constitutes a generic or general cause of wildfires in forested areas, but not a particular cause of any single wildfire event. By inclusion of both in reference to the same effect-determination, an increase in reference intension of factor-quantity (the general cause), is seen to be a decrease in reference-extension of factor-quality (the particular cause). Insofar as the former is described as singular, an optional constraint is placed on it so that a causal regress does not obtain which would hinder practical action. Would this for Anscombe make an Idealism of logical form (i.e. rule-variant) become a Realism of anthropological matter? Does a limit to causal regress in etiological judgement imply a release of effect progress in sociological prescript?

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melmedarda's picture

melmedarda

Saturday, January 18, 2025 -- 5:37 AM

How does Anscombe's theory of

How does Anscombe's theory of intentionality account for actions that have both intended and unintended consequences, and how does this relate to our moral responsibility for those consequences?

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maheera.alfonick

Wednesday, April 23, 2025 -- 5:13 AM

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jeffreestar

Wednesday, April 23, 2025 -- 8:19 PM

What a fascinating take on

What a fascinating take on Elizabeth Anscombe’s philosophy of action! Her insight into how the same action can be described in multiple ways—like the train passenger rushing for the door Escape Road City or the man poisoning Nazis—really flips how we think about intention.

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