Why I am not a Wittgensteinian
Saturday, March 3, 2007 -- 4:00 PM
Ken Taylor

Today's episode is about Wittgenstein. Our guest will be Juliet Floyd.

Many regard Wittgenstein as perhaps the greatest philosopher of the 20th century. I don't share that view. But there's no denying that, for a man who published only one book during his lifetime -- a book that he later basically repudiated -- he really did have a tremendous impact on 20th century analytic philosophy. Indeed, Wittgenstein has to be regarded as one of the great founding fathers of 20th century analytic philosophy, especially of the so-called linguistic turn in philosophy.

Now I don't profess at all to be an expert on Wittgenstein. I did read a fair amount of Wittgenstein as a graduate student at the University of Chicago, where a number of my teachers had an enduring fascination with his work. I don't doubt that Wittgenstein was a deep, ingenious, and highly impactful philosophy. Nonetheless, I find myself resistant to much of his philosophy -- especially his later philosophy. In the rest of this post, I'll try to say a bit about why.

When I say that I find myself resistant to much of Wittgenstein's philosophy, it's not so much this or that particular claim of his that I resist. There's lots of things that Wittgenstein says in his great work the Philosophical Investigations, for example, that I find intriguing, deep, challenging, and well worth thinking about even today. I presume we'll talk about some of his more intriquing philosophical claims today -- his picture theory of meaning, his claim that the limits of my language are the limits of my world, his later (and highly influential) view that meaning is use, his argument against the very possibility of a private language. All this is rich and provocative stuff. And though I probably ultimately reject a lot of it, it isn't these things that I find so hard to swallow from Wittgenstein. It's really his "metaphilosophical" outlook that I find myself constantly recoiling from. That is, it's his views about how to do philosophy and what you can and cannot achieve by doing philosophy that I most firmly reject.

Let me explain. Wittgenstein, especially the later Wittgenstein, viewed philosophy as it had been practiced more or less up his own arrival as mostly a budget of confusions. Philosophical problems and "theories" one and all arise, he says at one point in the Philosophical Investigations, from language gone on a holiday. The rough idea is that a whole lot of philosophy gets going by taking terms like say "knowledge" or "mind" or "idea" or -- take your pick -- and raising questions that have nothing to do with our sort of everyday use of such terms in the context of the "language games" in which they are at home.

Take the so-called problem of other minds. How does this problem get started? Well, Descartes convinced many philosophers that we have immediate and incorrigible access to the contents of our own minds, as if the mind were somehow completely open to itself. It's clear we don't in the same way know the contents of the minds of others. Starting with that observation, it really wouldn't take much argument to get yourself into the frame of thinking that one can reasonably and intelligibly wonder whether we have anyway of knowing about the minds of others. And once you got yourself into that state of wonder, it wouldn't take a whole lot of further argument to convince yourself to be an utter sceptic about our knowledge of other minds. Of course, at least some other philosophers will be unmoved by your scepticism. They may take themselves to be the guardians of common sense. But as soon as they admit that your arguments at least deserve answering, that there really is a problem about our knowledge of other minds, then we're off and running on a race to see which set of philosophical arguments will carry the day. Sceptical arguments will war with anti-sceptical arguments. the debate will go on -- probably interminably, with no real resolution ever being achieved.

We philosophers tend to think of our problems as "enduring." But the Wittgensteinian thought is that that may just be another way of saying intractable, however. And Wittgenstein can be seen as offering us an explanation of why we find the problems so intractable. That's the point of his saying that philosophical problems arise when language goes on holiday. This is not for him a sign that the problems of philosophy are deep. It is rather a sign that they are grounded in utter confusion and abuse of language.

Now I won't try to reconstruct the arguments that might lead one down the primrose path of worrying about our knowledge of other minds. I'll leave that as exercise to the reader for now. What Wittgenstein wants to do for philosophy is to give us a way of avoiding taking even the very first step down such paths in the first place. The secret, he thinks, is simply to look at how we actually use such terms as 'knowledge' 'self' 'others' etc in the real life language games and "forms of life" in which those terms are at home. Philosophy should simply stick to describing use. It should abandon the grand hope of building philosophical theories of things like mind, knowledge and self. It has no particular resources for enabling it to construct such theories in the first place. And all of its past attempts to do so have led to intractable confusion.

Once we abandon the urge to build grand philosophical theories designed to get at, as it were, hidden philosophical essences, and simply look at how language is actually used, it's not so much that we thereby solve the traditional philosophical problems, It's rather that we dissolve them. If we simply look at our actual practices, we will see that the idea that we know the contents of our own minds in some immediate, incorrigible fashion that is different from the way in which we we know the minds of others cannot be sustained. The very problem that gets the whole intractable debate about our knowledge of self vs. our knowledge of other minds is based again on "language gone on a holiday." And once you see this, the problem immediately dissolves itself.

There's something profound about Wittgenstein's approach. Not without reason did generations of later philosophers find it a potent rallying cry. It's certainly true that we want to pay attention to how our language is actually used and we don't want, through mere inattention to the facts of use, to generate pseudo problems. But I have to say that I think it is a serious mistake to think that all the so-called traditional problems of philosophy are mere pseudo-problems borne of insufficient attention to how we actually use certain quite ordinary terms, that, in their everyday use, are completely unproblematic.

Since I'm going to have to leave for the studio pretty soon, I'm not sure I can spell this all out before airtime. Probably I'll come back to it after the show and provide an update. But here's a couple of quick takes on why I don't share Wittgenstein's assessment of the "enduring" philosophical problems and his assessment of what to do about them. First, I think it's wrong to say that if we just look at how the language is actually used the problem about other minds would simply go away. One needn't doubt that we do know the minds of others. One can simply wonder both how possibly we could know the minds of others and how actually we do, in fact, do so. Both of these strike me as important and interesting questions. The former is the kind of question that you'll find a philosopher more likely to be asking. And the second -- the how actually question -- is one you'll find a psychologist/cognitive scientist more likely to be asking.

I could say a lot about the nature of how possibly questions. Think of what you're doing when you ask and try to answer a how possibly question like this. You've got an initial budget of concepts -- maybe concepts of mind, knowledge, self, others. And reflecting on these concepts you find yourself puzzled as to how these concepts "coordinate" with one another. You can see how possibly a thinking being can know itself, but your puzzled about how a thinking being can know the contents of the mind of another thinking being. You start to imagine the possibilities. In so doing, you are, as it were, taking an imaginative walk through a range of alternative possible worlds, trying to see if there are any in which one mind knows the contents of another mind. If you find one, and if it's not too far away from the actual world, you conclude that yes one mind can know the contents of another mind. If you don't find one, or if the ones you find are very very far from the actual world, you become a sceptic or conclude that one can only know the contents of one's own mind.

You can read Wittgenstein as arguing that we don't really have any discplined way to walk through the range of possibilities in any way likely to produce stable conviction. Instead of trying to take unconstrained and undisciplined walks through a range of imagined, but un-ordered possibilities, we should just look. Look at how we actually talk about mind, self, knowledge and other in the actual language games we play when we do so in the context of the lived forms of life that give those games point.

I think there is something to this advice. But not everything that Wittgenstein seems to think.

Consider the practicing cognitive scientist. What we do when we walk through a range of alternative worlds in the imagination can feel a lot different from what we do when we do science. Take your practicing cognitive scientist who wants to know how minds actually cognize one another. How does she go about constructing a theory of how people actually manage to know the minds of others. Well one thing she doesn't do is to simply look at how words like "knowledge" "mind" "self" "others" etc are used in ordinary language games. She might take such use as data points. But she's perfectly prepared to find out that people don't actually have much of a clue as to how we actually go about figuring out what other people think and believe. So what does she do? She deploys more or less tried and true methods of hypothesis generation and testing. She does experiments, she builds models, etc. That is, she draws on all the ways and means of empirical inquiry to try to figure out exactly how, in fact, we so regularly, reliably and systematically figure out what other people feel, believe, and desire. [She also notices that we are not so good at figuring out our own thoughts and feelings.

But what about the poor philosopher? The psychologist cum cognitive scientist in her attempt ot answer the how actually question about our knowledge of other minds is armed to the teeth. She has all the ways and means of empirical inquiry to draw upon. But what do we poor philosophers have to draw on in trying to answer our how possibly question? One worry might be the one we discussed above. We philosophers really don't have much to draw on except our own unconstrained philosophical imaginations. But philosophical imagination unmoored to the everyday forms of life that give our language games point, is a paltry thing, a thing more likely to mislead than illuminate. So perhaps what Wittgenstein is trying to do by suggesting that we look at how language actually works is simply to give us a way to constrain the imagination in ways that prevent it from just running rampant.

I applaud that instict, if that was the instinct. But take it a step further. Why restrict ourselves to just in tact "language games" in which the problematic terms and concepts supposedly have their homes? You wouldn't recommend that procedure to the practicing psychologist cum cognitive scientist would you? You wouldn't say look only at what people say. Don't do clever experiments designed to ferret out the hidden inner mechanisms or regularities not immediately evident in our everyday practices and our everyday descriptions of those practices.

WHy should the evidential base for our philosophy be more restricted than the evidential base for the construction of psychological and other theories.

Because philosophy is, well, different, and sui generis? I don't think so. Philosophy, on my view, is very much continuous with science. I don't mean to say that philosophy is just one science among others. It isn't. For one thing philosophy really is much more concerned, often, with "how possibly, if at all" sorts of questions than the sciences typically are and less concerned with the "how actually" than the sciences typically are. But how possibly questions should really be thought of as "how possibly, given what we know" questions. And as science increases our knowledge of the actual, we get greater and greater resources for constraining our answers to the how possibly questions that are our stock and trade.

Since I'm writing at sort of break-neck pace because I want to get this up before I leave for the studio, I'm not sure if I'm being clear. So let me try a quick statement of a kind of anti-Wittgensteinian bottom line, that concedes something but far from everything to Wittgenstein. Just starting out bare, with a bare "how possibly question" isn't likely to get you very far. All you have to go on, from square one, is one's own philosophical imagination. But an imagination unconstrained is probably not a reliable guide to anything very deep. Looking at actual language in practice can be one source of constraints. There is a way we actually do talk about the minds of others. There is the actual evidence that we do use to support our actual conclusions about the contents of others minds. And its wise advice that we start out by looking at such things. But we should also be prepared to look eslewhwere -- at, for example, the deliverances of cognitive science -- and constrain our imaginations by those deliverances as well. And we should also be prepared to find that our everyday practices are sometimes infected with all sorts of illusory material, founded on all sorts of historical mistakes and misdiagnosis that achieve through the mechanisms of cultural transmission the status of received wisdom. That is, we should be prepared to find that common sense and ordinary usage may themselves stand in need of thoroughgoing reformation.

But once we see that we can constrain our imaginations in lots of different ways, from lots of different sources, in its walk through a space of possibilities, why believe that we are prevented from even beginning the walk? Why despair that we will only end in confusion and chaos and intractable fruitless debate? Maybe we will, but we are not bound to.

Of course, another worry is that if we make more and more progress on the how actually questions, the how possibly questions will eventually cease to grip us. And at least that part of philosophy will come to an end. Maybe. But we are often gripped by how possibly questions when we cannot even begin to get a grip on how the thing actually works. I don't know what mechanisms are actually in there, but let's see what mechanism might be in there. And once we consider which ones might be there, let's see if we can eliminate some of the possible ones and hone in on the actual ones. Is the elimination of possibilites a scientific or a merely philosophical undertaking? I think the answer must be really both and. And as long as there are domains ripe for conceptual reconfiguration, there will always be room for philosophy. Philosophy will end only when conceptual puzzlement itself comes to an end.

With that, I really gotta go, as Ian Shoales is found of saying.

 

Comments (17)


Guest

Saturday, March 3, 2007 -- 4:00 PM

I tend to have a somewhat deflationary view of why

I tend to have a somewhat deflationary view of why Wittgenstein was so influential. He was one of the few who was really expert at the new logic when it was first becoming a big deal, and at that time there was a perception (largely accurate, I think) that the new logic was enormously philosophically important and so a tendency on the part of those who didn't quite understand it to be extremely deferential to those who did understand it.
If that is the origin of Wittgenstein's influence, it would explain why his star has fallen so far; mere competence in logic no longer impresses people the way it used to. This is partly because it is more widespread, but also, sadly I think, partly because people have become complacent. Still, while I think the familiarity which has made it harder for modern philosophers to see some of the more dramatic philosophical consequences of post-Fregean logic has produced some retrograde philosophy, I tend to think that to the extent it has undermined Wittgenstein's mystique, that's been a good thing.

Guest

Saturday, March 3, 2007 -- 4:00 PM

Not being a Wittengenstein is this just based on t

Not being a Wittengenstein is this just based on the philosopher at the bottom, but at the same time rising toward the middle of the totem pole? Not having the same methods of Descates's methods or Kierkegaard who was infuenced by a great regard for math & science. To much or too little thinking? One book or 250 books? What makes the great Philosopher stand out in the crowd? What make not being a Wittengenstein--- a Wittengenstein, a Plato, or even a Socrates? You be the judge.

Guest

Saturday, March 3, 2007 -- 4:00 PM

There are many living who profess philosophy. Not

There are many living who profess philosophy. Not one is a philosopher.
The last living philosopher died in August 1900. His mind had been dead since January 1889. Like Wittgenstein his native language was German. Who in the 20th or 21st century is fit to untie Nietzsche's bootlaces?
Certainly not the misshapen growths suffering from hypertrophy of empirico-logico-linguisticism transplanted into Anglophone seedbeds from decaying and destroyed empires. Only a Kafka could spin such an absurdist libretto, with bloated score by Mahler.
LW is "queer." (Thus translating 'seltsam' with Anscombe.)
LW required acolytes. He was oracular.
He needs hermeneutics.

Guest

Saturday, March 3, 2007 -- 4:00 PM

Surely, Kenneth, there are a few gaps in Wittgenst

Surely, Kenneth, there are a few gaps in Wittgenstein's method. But it is useful, anyway. And I would like to comment on some of your ideas using it. You say that philosophy, in contrast to science (and anything else), is engaged in questions "how is it possible?" But is it really so? Let us look when such questions arise. You see a trick (say, David Copperfield's Laser Illusion) and ask "how is it possible to do that?" Is it a philosophical question? I guess, it is not. We need a trick, anyway. But I think we need something else, as well, to make questions about tricks the philosophical questions: they should be answered by clarification of our concepts only. I believe, you would agree with that. But are there any tricks which could be solved as a result of clarification of our concepts? I don't know, but if they exist, I doubt we wouldn't able to describe such clarification in terms of Wittgenstein's vocabulary. Indeed, how is it possible:) to clarify our concepts? By looking at the use of the terms attached to them, first of all. If it turns out that our concepts are imprecise, why not invent new concepts, new language games? I see no contradictions here with what Wittgenstein had proposed.

Guest

Monday, March 5, 2007 -- 4:00 PM

It seems like the deflationary view of Wittgenstei

It seems like the deflationary view of Wittgenstein's influence, chalking up Wittgenstein's influence just to proficiency with logic, gets things wrong. The people he influenced early on included Bertrand Russell, Frank Ramsey, and the Vienna circle, which had Carnap and Reichenbach in its ranks. These people were all top notch logicians who wouldn't give someone that much of their time just on the basis of being able to handle logic. Since then Wittgenstein has impressed people like Michael Dummett and Saul Kripke, again great philosophers. I think they saw more in Wittgenstein's thoughts than proficiency with logic. If Wittgenstein's influence is waning, there are probably other sociological or philosophical reasons for it.
It seems like cognitive science is not at odds with being a Wittgensteinian by itself. Other commitments might make one think that Wittgenstein was wrong, but the idea of cognitive science by itself seems compatible. Part of the reason for thinking this is the list of the 100 most influential books in cognitive science published by a group of cognitive scientists from Minnesota. The list is available here: http://www.cogsci.umn.edu/OLD/calendar/past_events/millennium/final.html
Philosophical Investigations comes in at 54. There are authors on there that are certainly hostile to Wittgenstein, but not all.

Guest

Monday, March 5, 2007 -- 4:00 PM

Hi Shawn: Hope you're enjoying Pitt. A hotbed

Hi Shawn:
Hope you're enjoying Pitt. A hotbed of at least neo-Wittgensteiniansm I suppose if there ever was one.
About Wittgenstein and cognitive science. My point wasn't that cognitive science refutes Wittgenstein. I used cognitive science only to show that "theorizing" about the mind in a way that goes beyond the deliverances of common sense is a perfectly legitimate enterprise. We do it all the time. And we think we're getting at something deep about the mind when we do.
If cognitive science can theorize about the mind or about knowledge or perception in a way that isn't necessarily tied to our ordinary language games, if we even assume that it may sometimes lead to the reformation and/or deformation of our ordinary language games, then why isn't it alright for philosophy to try to do the same?
Wittgenstein must think that somehow philosophy isn't entitled to theorize in this way, that when it tries to it's bound to fall into error and confusion. But why think that? Why think that is any more true of philosophy than of cognitive science? If one thought that philosophy's methods weren't broadly empirical or weren't broadly continuous with empirical methods, you might think something like that. But why think that? Of course, philosophy isn't exactly science. That was what I meant when I said that philosophy is more likely to be concerned with how possibly questions than science is. But that's not to say philosophy is only concerned with how possibly questions. It isn't. But the point of comparison was to say that philosophy has at least as many sources of evidence and sources of constraint on its theory construction as science does. It can, after all, take the entirety of science on board as a source of evidence and constraint.

Guest

Wednesday, March 7, 2007 -- 4:00 PM

Wittgenstein is for those who can find a resonance

Wittgenstein is for those who can find a resonance in his vision before reading his work.

Guest

Saturday, March 10, 2007 -- 4:00 PM

Wow, Ken, I found this an incredibly insightful po

Wow, Ken, I found this an incredibly insightful post. It is both generous to Wittgenstein and also probing in its disagreement.
A couple of small points. What you describe--an imagination that is not entirely free, but constrained by science, etc.--is very similar to what Rawls called "wide" as opposed to "narrow" reflective equilibruim, in which one's considered judgments have to fit with the "best social and natural science", and so forth.
Also, I think there are two kinds of philosophical "how-possibly" questions. I talk about this distinction in a recent paper of mine, "Molinism", which I can give anyone who is interested. (I'll spare you the details here, out of mercy.) One kind of question is answered by the contents of a "how-to manual", whereas a deeper (as it were) kind is answered in a way that may include this sort of content but also engages the most powerful worries of the skeptic about the phenomenon in question. So, consider time travel. One kind of how-possibly question gets answered in terms of the skeptical worries about the coherence of time travel, the fixity of the past, the direction of causation, the paradox of the power to kill one's grandparents, etc. But another gets answered in terms of a "how-to manual"--first you build the time-machine, etc. (Or consider the recent Denzel Washington film, "Deja Vu" for further ruminations on the mechanism of time-travel!)
I think sometimes even philosophers mix up the two kinds of "how-possibly" questions, settling for an answer suitable to a "how-to manual", where an engagement with skeptical challenges is in order.
Again, let me just say how helpful and insightful I found your post.

Guest

Monday, April 2, 2007 -- 5:00 PM

I am a bit of a Wittgensteinian, although rather o

I am a bit of a Wittgensteinian, although rather out of practice, having left grad school a few years ago. I would like to offer an answer to the question raised above: why might LW object to philosophical theorizing about the mind, but not to cognitive science? It may be because LW understands philosphy as attempting to deal with necessity (and, in his last work, certainty). The philosopher's arguments and theories would concern how things must be, while the scientist's arguments and theories would concern how things in fact happen to be. Certainly if one looks at the Tractatus, this sort of division between science and philosophy is quite prominent, while in On Certainty it reappears as the distinction between what we know and what is certain for us. LW seems to have been convinced throughout his career that the necessary/certain was different in kind from the contingent/known (or knowable), and one way to read the body of his work (a reading that, incidentally, understands the later work as a continuation, rather than repudiation, of his earlier work) is as an ongoing attempt to articulate this difference and the problems it presents.

Guest

Sunday, April 15, 2007 -- 5:00 PM

If Wittgenstein's goal is not yours---if you a

If Wittgenstein's goal is not yours---if you are correct that his goal is some kind of release from the conundrums of philosophy-- then why should you follow his path?--
At bottom, his goals don't attract you.
Still, it is useful to see how he did try to get out
from under the sway of philosophical conundrums.
But ultimately, if we evaluate his writings from the point of view of his writings--if we apply his own perspective to his own writings--we can see that his
problem--that philosophy deals with pseudo- problems----seems itself to be a pseudo-problem.
Because certainly ordinary language has no opinion, either way about whether philosophy deals
with pseudo-problems or does not. Ordinary language does not seem to agree that his problem is a problem. And certainly Wittgenstein doesn't give us any arguments
that ordinary language as a whole has some built-in
resistance to being used by philosophers in the way that they do.
If one doesn't share what seems to be his annoyance at being somehow "trapped" by conundrums of a philosophical
sort--then I don't see any compelling reason to
think his problem any less pseudo than the unnatural philosophical constraints he insists ordinary language is subjected to by others.
Surely, he could not deny that he bends ordinary
language to his own very philosophical uses within a very philosophical context. He is not exactly down at
the corner store exchanging gossip as he buys tomatoes--right?

Guest

Sunday, April 15, 2007 -- 5:00 PM

If Wittgenstein's goal is not yours---if you a

If Wittgenstein's goal is not yours---if you are correct that his goal is some kind of release from the conundrums of philosophy-- then why should you follow his path?--
At bottom, his goals don't attract you.
Still, it is useful to see how he did try to get out
from under the sway of philosophical conundrums.
But ultimately, if we evaluate his writings from the point of view of his writings--if we apply his own perspective to his own writings--we can see that his
problem--that philosophy deals with pseudo- problems----seems itself to be a pseudo-problem.
Because certainly ordinary language has no opinion, either way about whether philosophy deals
with pseudo-problems or does not. Ordinary language does not seem to agree that his problem is a problem. And certainly Wittgenstein doesn't give us any arguments
that ordinary language as a whole has some built-in
resistance to being used by philosophers in the way that they do.
If one doesn't share what seems to be his annoyance at being somehow "trapped" by conundrums of a philosophical
sort--then I don't see any compelling reason to
think his problem any less pseudo than the unnatural philosophical constraints he insists ordinary language is subjected to by others.
Surely, he could not deny that he bends ordinary
language to his own very philosophical uses within a very philosophical context. He is not exactly down at
the corner store exchanging gossip as he buys tomatoes--right?

Guest

Tuesday, January 19, 2010 -- 4:00 PM

Ken wrote: "Wittgenstein is for those who can find

Ken wrote: "Wittgenstein is for those who can find a resonance in his vision before reading his work"
This is a very insightful comment!

Guest

Saturday, November 24, 2012 -- 4:00 PM

I'm a bit frustrated (maybe

I'm a bit frustrated (maybe ignorantly) with the entry, perhaps five years too late. I think the first objection ludwig would have is that you are using the phrase "mind" like its a word like "apple." It's not, and that's the problem with philosophy. We use "mind" to mean something, and removing it from that context reduces it to nonsense. You sublimated the word to a frictionless plane where it's useless or confused. Sure, cognitive scientists can investigate the physical brain and its processes, but that is not an exploration of the "mind," it's an exploration of the brain's physical processes. The superficial resemblance between the two is clear, but its only a superficial similarity.

Guest

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