Suppose we know what all the goods are. It doesn't matter whether we are hedonists or ideal utilitarians who want to include knowledge or virtue or instances of beauty or whatever as goods. Perhaps we just think goods are satisfactions of wants--whether they produce pleasure or not. For the moment, it doesn't matter. Let's just suppose we know what they are.
Now, let us also leave aside issues of equality, justice, etc. or, perhaps we can consider them but assume that in all the situations or worlds we want to compare, we have perfect equality, and when we increase goods we increase them equally for everyone. Is it the case that a world with more good (or goods) in it must be (perhaps by definition) better than a world with less? We don't say that for portions of pie, for example. There isn't only marginal decreases in additional utility when we keep adding pieces of pie to our daily intake--there's clear decrement. We might say that in the case of pie, at some point there isn't actually addition of good when more pieces are eaten, that we aren't adding goods at all. But what about such reputed "intrinsic goods" as pleasure, or satisfaction of desires? Some philosophers have said that if one were addicted pleasure machines one is unlikely to do anything to improve one's own life or the lives of others in any (other) way. But again, we can just rule that out by stipulation: we can agree that in the cases of the goods we are interested in increasing the situation is like neither pie--where one gets sick--nor like addition to crystal meth--where one is mostly concerned with getting more.
What I want to know is whether even with all these (unrealistic) provisos it is true when we compare two worlds in which one has more equitably distributed good(s) in it than the other, the world with more good(s) has got to be better. What do people think about this?