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![]() Notes on show: Original Airdate 07/19/2005 |
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About the Guest Walter Sinnott-Armstrong's research interests include ethics, philosophy of law, epistemology, and informal logic. In applied ethics, he has worked on abortion, nuclear deterrence, the insanity defense, computer ethics, and, recently, environmental ethics. In moral theory, he has written on moral dilemmas, consequentialism, and moral epistemology, where he defends limited moral skepticism. In informal logic, he creates teaching videos and defends the propositional calculus. In philosophy of law, he studies constitutional interpretation and defends a perspectival theory of law that grants some truth to the classic antagonists: legal positivism, legal realism, and natural law theory. He also published a debate book on the existence of God. Currently he is working on moral psychology and brain science. His publications include:
Listening Notes What is a dilemma? A situation in which you have to do two things but you can't do both. What is special about moral dilemmas? Do moral dilemmas stem from different sources of value? John introduces the guest, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, professor at Dartmouth. Sinnott-Armstrong thinks that Judith Miller's case did not involve a moral dilemma. How far do Miller's obligations extend? Would she have to endure torture? Sinnott-Armstrong thinks the most compelling kinds of dilemmas involve symmetric obligations, conflicting, identical obligations to two parties. Do moral dilemmas always involve a residue of guilt? Does guilt entail that there is a moral dilemma? Are there any real moral dilemmas? Sinnott-Armstrong thinks there are, such as a mother that has to choose which of two children will live. Is it possible to reason out which horn of a moral dilemma is the proper choice? Sinnott-Armstrong thinks that some apparent dilemmas can be solved but not all of them. Sophie's Choice represents a very difficult moral dilemma in which the agent did not do anything to get herself into the problem. Sinnott-Armstrong distinguishes between judgments of particular actions and judgments of particular agents. Can moral theories solve all the problems that could arise? Sinnott-Armstrong thinks they can't but that that does not undermine their worth. Why do people want moral theories to cover all possible situations? Sinnott-Armstrong thinks that people want this to avoid having to make difficult decisions. He illustrates this with an example from Sartre of a French soldier in World War 2. Utilitarians may claim that all moral dilemmas are epistemological. Are all moral dilemmas the result of us not knowing enough about the future? Ken thinks that this view ignores different kinds of value in life. Sinnott-Armstrong says that the non-symmetric moral dilemmas force us to choose what kind of person to be.
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