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![]() Notes on show: Original Airdate 05/11/2004 |
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About the Guest Professor Gruen's current research lies at the intersection of ethical theory and ethical practice. This work is guided by two philosophical commitments. First, Professor Gruen's work is motivated by the belief that ethics should be aimed primarily at enhancing well-being. Her work is thus consequentialist, although her consequentialism is distinct from familiar forms of consequentialism in a number of ways. The second philosophical commitment that motivates and is expressed in Professor Gruen's work is a commitment to justice, although her interest in justice tends to identify unjustified distributions of benefits and burdens in areas that have previously been set to the side by others working on questions of justice. So, for example, she is concerned about the ways in which environmental degradation or advances in biotechnologies disproportionately harms poor communities, communities of color, and children. In addition to the familiar concerns about injustice against certain individuals or communities of people, Professor Gruen's work is also concerned with injustice to non-human animals.
Listening Notes
Is it wrong to cause animals pain? Is it morally wrong? Do animals have rights? Some pain is instrumentally good, like pain that alerts us of ailments. What kinds of pain are bad to cause? Why is it different to cause pain to humans rather than to do so to other animals? Ken thinks that humans have projects and goals, and so it is wrong to cause them pain as it interrupts their projects. John introduces Lori Gruen, professor at Wesleyan. Even if we admit that killing, say, puppies is wrong, does that mean we should say killing slugs is wrong? Gruen thinks this sort of question trivializes the issue. John distinguishes between sensation and consciousness.
Gruen says that killing animals for food is morally acceptable if there is no other way to get food. Is eating chickens that are raised under acceptable conditions morally all right? Ken asks if talk about rights gets used too much. Does rights talk get used instead of substantive moral arguments? By what principles do we distinguish which creatures have moral worth and which do not? Dogs and apes have emotions. Does this influence their moral status?
Are there different kinds of pleasures and pains that we should distinguish morally? Mill thought so. How do we evaluate the relative weight of various pains and pleasures? Ken objects saying that he could structure his whole life around one sort of pleasure, say, fishing. Shouldn't that weigh more heavily for Ken than for someone else who thinks it is frivolous? Ken says that it is contingent if someone dislikes killing things and that there is a tendency to project one's dislikes to moral claims. Does utilitarianism view eating meat that as intrinsically bad? Gruen does not think so.
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